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EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF UTILITY REGULATIO N 
Roger G. Noll 
During the past fifteen years, numerous studies have been 
published that purport to demonstrate quantitatively the effects of 
price and profit regulation on regulated monopolies. The purpose 
of this paper is to provide a brief, minimally technical summary and 
evaluation of these studies. For the most part, the fine theoretical 
and econometric details are ignored in favor of an exposition cf the 
general approach that researchers have taken to the problem of estimating 
regulatory effects. While the primary focus is on studies of so-called 
"natural monopolies," references are also made for purposes of com-
parison to studies exa�ining the effect of regulation on competitive 
markets. The Bibliography contains the standard references on the 
empirical effects of price regulation in all the basic infrastructural 
industries -- energy, telecommunications and transportation -- whether 
competitive or monopolistic. 
Empirical studies of utility regulation can usefully be 
divided into three categories: analyses of prices directly, �ith 
little or no reference to the cost and production relations of the 
firms or industries under examination; estimates of cost and/or 
production functions, which are then used to measure the divergence of 
output and input mix from the economic optimum; and investigations of 
the innovative performance of regulated firms. The price studies, 
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examined more closely in the first section of this report, generally 
conclude that regulation has had no discernible effect on prices in 
the utility industries until quite recently. Yet studies based upon 
estimates of cost and production functions normally conclude that 
regulation increases costs of the regulated service. The combined 
implication of these findings is that regulation erodes monopoly profits 
not by reducing prices and expanding output, but by creating costly 
inefficiency. The resolution of this apparently paradoxial result 
is not difficult, for technical flaws of analysis in both sets of 
studies make the validity of their findings dubious. The final section 
offers a few conclusions and speculations regarding the true messages 
contained in the literature under scrutiny. 
This paper does not deal in detail with the research on the 
effect of regulation on technological change. The studies undertaken 
to date are not successful in proving or disproving a general, per-
vasive effect of regulation on innovation. The best papers examine the 
development and diffusion of specific innovations, perhaps then 
offering a few tentative generalizations based upon these stories. 
Outstanding examples include the study by Hughes of electrical power 
generation and by MacAvoy and Sloss of the adoption of the unit train. 
Other notable studies are those by Gellman, Shepherd and Phillips. 
Since economists have not been notably successful in estimating 
empirically the effect of regulation on static efficiency or of con-
ditions in unregulated markets on progressivity of firms, it is, at 
this date, too early to expect much progress on the more complicated 
issue of the effect of regulation on innovation. 
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DIRECT PRICE COMPARISONS 
The simplest approach to studying the effects of regulation 
is to make a straightforward comparison of prices in markets subject 
to different regulatory schemes, including the complete absence of 
regulation. Electric utilities are sufficiently numerous and, histori-
cally, subject to a sufficiently wide variety of regulatory systems 
that direct comparisons of their prices are potentially useful. 
Kofoglis and Needy have recently published data on the level 
and dispersion of prices by class of customer for large, privately 
owned electrical utilities across the country. Table 1 shows the
mean price for consumer power and the mean degree of price dispersion, 
according to their measure, 
_/ 
_/ 
for several states. Unregulated states 
Kof oglis and Needy use a version of the gini coefficient to 
measure rate dispersion, based upon a diagram that plots the percentage 
of output consumed by a customer class against the p ercentage of 
revenues supplied by the same class. The dispersion index measures 
the extent to which the distribution of revenue diverges from the 
distribution of power use; the modified index calculates the dispersion 
that would result if the price structure of each firm were applied 
to the distribution of output among classes that is the average for 
all firms. 
are, in the table, grouped with contiguous, regulated states which 
presumably face similar cost and demand conditions. Obviously, the 
table reveals no visible effect of regulation; more detailed statistical 
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by regulated utilities. This was then used as a measure of the 
intensity of regulation in a statistical analysis of interstate 
differences in electricity prices. Moore found a significant, 
positive correlation between prices and regulatory intensity, and 
concluded that the greater is the expenditure on regulation, the 
higher are the resulting prices to consumers. 
This finding is consistent with the results of studies 
_j 
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of the effect of regulation in most competitive industries. Levine 
_j 
The only price regulators clearly lower is the field price 
of natural gas. See Breyer and MacAvoy, Erickson and Spann, Helms, 
MacAvoy (19 7 3) and Pindyck. 
was the first of many to notice that airline fares are lower in 
unregulated intrastate markets than for interstate routes regulated 
by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). Farmer, T. G. Moore (19 75),
Sloss, and Switzler and Byrne have all made slightly different 
comparisons be�veen regulated and unregulated trucking prices, and 
have all concluded that the Interstate Commerce Commission ( ICC) 
causes higher prices than unregulated competition would produce. 
One difficulty with most price comparisons is that the 
results can be due to several causes besides regulation that produce 
a spurious correlation between costs and the presence of regulation. 
In transportation, studies of the change in prices at the time 
regulation was imposed have left little doubt about the causality 
between regulation and prices. The Switzler and Byrne studies 
measured the price effect of a change in the list of types of 
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shipments that were exempted from ICC regulation, and Spann and 
Erickson estimated that the increase in long-haul rates on railroads 
far more than offset the decrease in short-haul rates following the 
establishment of the ICC. 
In other areas, notably utility pricing, the failure to 
include cost factors or to examine the effects of changes in 
regulatory status makes the results of the studies of price 
differences of dubious value. Interstate differences in costs can 
arise for numerous reasons: the availability of cheaper hydro-
electric power, the availability and price of alternative fuels, 
the magnitude of the market in franchise areas and the extent of 
pooling (the last two affect the extent to which scale economies can 
be captured) . C. G. Moore's results, for example, may arise 
because states with high per capita expenditures on regulation 
have smaller, more dispersed populations uhich can be supplied only 
at higher costs. It would be surprising to find that the number of 
customers of regulated firms was, in any event, the relevant factor 
in determining the costs of any given degree of regulatory intensity. 
The number of firms and the expansion of capacity in the indi:.stry 
presumably affect the costs of any given degree of intensity of 
regulation more directly than does the number of consumers served. 
All price studies suffer from still another problem. The 
decision to regulate or to increase the amount of resources available 
to regulatory authorities is presumably based on some rational calculus 
by actors in the political system. Hence, the decision to adopt 
particular state regulatory policies would not be independent of 
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the performance of utilities. If regulati0n is a response 
to general public sentiment for lower prices, one might expect 
states with higher prices to be among the first to impose regulation 
and to devote the most resources to regulating. Or, if, as Stigler 
maintains, regulation is a response to protectionist demands of 
regulated firms, one would expect, cetris paribus, that regulation 
would be imposed first, and most extensively, in jurisdictions with 
lower prices owing to greater competition. In either case, a 
single equation estimate of the relation between prices and regula­
tion proves nothing; it measures the composite effects of prices on 
the propensity to regulate and of regulation on prices. 
Studies of the relationship between regulation and profits 
also show no significant correlations. MacAvoy (1971), and Breyer 
a,.;d MacAvoy, provide evidence that the Federal Power Commission 
(FPC) sets the allowed rate of return sufficiently high that firms 
do not earn it. Eads (1971) makes the same point with respect to 
C.llJl regulation. Stigler and Friedland notice no effect of regulation 
on equity returns of electric utilities. McDonald, without 
referencing the effects of regulation directly, estimates that the 
cost of equity capital for most firms is about one percentage point 
higher than the interest rate it pays on long-term bonds. If so, 
assuming a debt/equity ratio of unity, the allowed rate of return 
need only be one-half a percentage point above the long-term bond 
rate for the utility, yet, until recently, allowed rates of return 
were normally substantially higher than this.· 
Recently unusually rapid inflation has depressed the 
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prices of utility securities (Keran). Joskow (1974) argues that this 
is to be expected. Rising nominal costs substantially increased the 
case load of regulatory authorities and shifted the costs of delay 
from consumers to producers, since the ultimate consequence of regulatory 
decisions shifted from reductions to increases in prices after inflation 
and environmental policies began raising nominal costs. 
Joskow and MacAvoy, in analyzing the financial condition of 
electric utilities, have estimated that current capital market condi­
tions will enable electric firms to raise sufficient capital to equate 
energy supply and demand only if allowed rates of return are raised 
to between fourteen and sixteen percent. These results appear in 
conflict with the findings of Keran and McDonald; the one percent rule 
of the latter suggests allowed rates of return of around ten percent, 
while the finding of the former regarding the behavior of utility 
equities prices, holding dividends constant, suggests a similar figure. 
Unfortunately, the Joskow and MacAvoy analysis has not yet appeared in 
sufficient detail to permit comparison of these studies. One potential 
problem with the study is the possiblility that its projections are 
heavily influenced by disequilibrium conditions in the early 1970s 
arising from increasingly stringent environmental policies, rising 
(rather than higher but steady) interest rates, rapid increases in fuel 
prices, and the unavailability of natural gas due to interstate regula­
tory policies. Nevertheless, all findings are consistent in one respect: 
rate of return limits on regulated firms have, indeed, become binding 
during the past few years. Whether the constraint is so tight that it 
10 
pushes the returns of the firm below the competitive level, or just 
erodes some monopoly fat that was included in the old limits, remains 
an open issue. 
COST AND PRODUCTION STUDIES 
The most interesting empirical work on the effects of 
regulation uses the conventional building blocks of microeconomics, 
supply and demand relationships , to measure the effects of regulation . 
Several studies of the effect of regulation on the electrical 
utilities industry are based on cost analyses . Emery provides 
evidence that electrical utilities were not participants in the equip­
ment ma.�ufacturers' conspiracies of the late 1950s by showing that 
prices paid by regulated firms for generating equipment did not 
differ by type of regulation . His approach is to estimate a cost 
function for installed electrical capacity, and then test the 
residual errors in that equation for systemmatic relationships with 
the type of regulation imposed upon the firm. Unfortunately, Emery 
confines his test to measuring the difference between regulation 
based upon replacement costs and regulation based upon original cost; 
he does not include in his sample either unregulated private firms 
or municipally owned utilities , nor does he explore in more than 
cursory fashion the possible presence of systemmatic changes in 
prices paid when regulatory status changed. Empirically, his proposi­
tion that no conspiracy existed remains unproven, although his 
theoretical argument is persuasive. 
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Petersen has also estimated cost functions for electric 
utilities with the objective of identifying shifts in the cost 
function attributable to regulation . His cost functions include 
three variables that measure the extent of regulation: a zero-one 
dummy representing states which have pub lie utilities commissions, 
another zero-one dummy for states that estimate allowed costs on an 
original cost basis, and the difference between the allowed rate of 
return and equity cost of capital . Petersen's results are that the 
regulation dummy and the measure of monopoly return are statisti­
cally significant in the cost function, and of the expected sign -­
that is, regulated firms have higher costs, while high profit firms 
have lower costs � jut that the type of regulation is not significant. 
Petersen's results do not p rove that regulation increases 
costs, and increasingly so as regulation tightens. McKay has shown 
that the regulation dummy measures primarily whether a firm is 
located in Texas, which, in addition to having no state regulation, 
also has had more readily available supplies of natural gas. 
Building thermal plants designed only for burning gas reduces 
capital costs, and McKay shows that in states with ample gas 
supplies capital costs are lower, regardless of regulatory status, 
than in other states . In addition, Petersen's results with respect 
to monopoly rents are also of uncertain meaning. They could, for 
example, reflect a tendency on the part of regulators to reward more 
efficient firms by allowing higher profits , or they could simply 
reflect a regulatory lag effect -- the high profit firms may have 
lower costs because , on average, they capture greater productivity 
increases between regulatory reviews. One would e:i-.-pect, for 
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example, that as long as productivity advances exceed the rate of 
factor cost inflation, firms in rapidly growing jurisdictions would 
have higher profits since they would add more new, highly productive 
facilities between rate cases. None of these aspects of the problem 
are considered by Petersen. 
T. G. Moore (19 70) and MacAvoy and Noll have attempted to
estimate the effects of regulation by estimating both cost and 
demand functions, and then investigating the divergence of regulated 
prices from unregulated, profit maximizing ones. Moore's study 
examines electric utility prices, while MacAvoy and Noll consider 
interstate pipelines. Both studies reach ambiguous conclusions, 
with some variants of the models showing no price effect of 
regulation and others showing a small price-reducing effect. Moore 
applies his model to publicly owned utilities, and does find that 
they charge significantly lower prices than would a profit-maximizing 
monopolist, so that even if regulation does have some price effect, 
Hoo re concludes, it is small compared to the effect of public owner-
ship. 
Both studies suffer from the problem of trying to estimate 
a demand function without having access to appropriate price data. 
Both electric utilities and pipelines use multipart tariffs, and 
marginal price data are not readily available. Moore uses the 
average. price for customers purchasing 250 h.-wh per month. As 
Taylor ha.s argued, such a procedure produc.es biased estimates of the 
elasticity of demand. Furthermore, it eliminates variability in 
the price structure as part of the profit-maximizing strategy of 
the firm; Moore has, essentially, found the revenue maximizing 
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point on the average price curve, given the mean price structure of 
utilities, but not necessarily the combination of price structure 
and average price that is optimal to the firm. 
MacAvoy and Noll were able to gather data on marginal 
prices for regulated pipeline sales, but could not locate such 
data for unregulated sales. Their paper makes two comparisons: 
aver.age prices in both markets, and marginal price in regulated markets 
contrasted to average price for unregulated sales. The latter shows 
a small, n.egative effect of regulation on prices, while the former 
indicates that the regulatory constraint is not binding. 
P.nother indirect test of the effects of regulation can 
be inferred from Primeaux. Using cost data from electrical utili-
ties that have overlapping franchise areas in which two firms, one 
private and one public, compete for customers, Primeaux estimated 
cost functions for municipally ovmed monopolistic and duopolistic 
producers. Primeaux found that duopolistic firms have significantly 
lower average costs, and that only monopolistic firms exhibit scale 
economies. At an output of 222  million kwh per year, the scale 
economies offset the average cost advantage, so that, Primeaux 
concludes, duopolistic markets can be justified on cost grounds only 
i.n small markets. This conclusion, however, is not justified, for 
only three of the twenty-three competitive firms in Primeaux's 
s.ample produce more than 200 million kwh per year, while ten of the
twenty.-four monopolistic firms produced more than this amount of 
po,,;·er.. Consequently, the error in estimated costs of large 
11+ 
monopolistic firms, being well within·the range of observations from 
whi.ch . the equation was estimated,' is likely to be considerably 
s:maller than the errors in estimates of costs for competitive firms. 
This px-ob.lem is. a natural consequence of Primeaux' s decision x-ule 
for selecting his sample of monopolistic firms: to hold constant 
as :many extraneous factors as possible , Primeaux attempted to match 
each competitive firm with a noncompetitive one in the same state, 
with the same power source , and of the same size. If the last 
cri.teri.on could not be satisfied , a larger monopolistic firm 
satisfying the other criteria ·was matched against the competitive one, 
hence the difference in mean firm size in the two samples. 
One possible criticism of Primeaux's work is that it deals 
on�y with nonprofit firms. Lacking the profit incentive , monopo-
listic municipals may be prone to be inefficient , whereas competitive 
municipals , facing the benchmark of a profit-oriented firm , can not 
afford that luxury. If so , Primeaux's finding may not be applicable 
to privately owned utilities. The likelihood that this is the case 
is somewhat mitigated by the finding of T .  G. Moore [1970] that 
municipals do have significantly lower average prices than do for-
profit firms, at least for the large firms in Moore's sample. 
The significance of Primeaux's work lies in the nature of 
the "regulatory bargain" between utilities and the political 
system, Regulation was imposed on firms in return for acquiescence 
to the creation of monopolistic franchise areas. Primeaux's finding , 
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if valid, suggests that creating these local monopolies generated 
production inefficiencies which , for small firms at least , of fset 
whatever scale economies monopolization might have made possible. 
Recently several scholars have undertaken to test 
empirically the most famous of theoretical propositions about 
regulation , the hallowed A-J ef fect , named after the celebrated 
paper by Averch and Johnson. The theory predicts that , at current 
output, firms subject to regulation based upon a fair return to 
capital will use excessively capital intensive production 
technologies. 
To test the A-J effect requires sp ecification of the 
J 
production trade-offs ·facing a firm. This enables a test of the 
_/ Petersen's test of the relationship between total cost and 
excess profits is not a test of the A-J effect, although his finding 
is consistent with the A-J predictions. One result of the A-J 
theory is the prediction that the more binding the regulatory 
constraint on profits, the greater the propensity of the firm to 
substitute capital for labor and hence to incur unnecessarily high 
production costs (see Baumol and Klevorick) . 
extent to which the factor proportions of a firm diverge from the 
cost-minimizing optimum for the rate of output selected. Four 
recent studies have performed such a test: Boyes , Courville, McKay 
and Spann. The score thus far is two to two. 
Boyes , Courville and Spann all take essentially the same 
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approach. Each estimates a production function for the annual 
electricity output of a thermal power plant, with one of the inputs 
being the capital costs of the facility. Courville and Spann use 
labor and fuel as the other two inputs to the production function, 
while Boyes uses these plus maintenance eA-penditures. Each estimates a 
different form of production function: Courville -- Cobb-Douglas, 
Spann -- translog, and Boyes -- CRES. Courville's test is based 
upon data from the period 1948 to 1966, excluding 1956-59 because 
(1) it produced different results than the other vintages and (2) 
i t  was the period o f  the electrical machinery manufacturers' 
conspiracy (see Emery). Spann uses data from 1959 to 1963, and 
Boyes considers only data from the conspiracy period -- 1956-59. 
All include in their sample only new plants. Courville and Spann 
find a significant A-J effect, and Boyes does not; however given 
Courville' s statement that the period used by Boyes was excluded 
because it produced strange results, it is certainly likely that 
Courville and Boyes agree on the 1956-59 results, and conceivable 
that Boyes would have reached different conclusion had he used a 
different set of data. 
Unfortunately, data problems are the least of the worries 
surrounding these papers. McKay has offered several killing points 
about any test structured along the lines of these studies. 
McKay's central point is that the use of capital costs 
as the measure of capital inputs confuses two distinct components 
of capital inputs: the capacity of the individual generating 
unit ar.d, given the capacity, the selection of a thermal efficiency 
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for the plant, With respect to the latter, a firm can substitute 
capital for fuel by spending more money on a plant that converts 
fuel to electical ene.rgy more efficiently. The A-J effect would be 
observable at the plant level only if firms selected facilities 
that were excessively efficient in converting fuel to electricity; 
consequently the relevant measure of capital for testing the A-J 
hypothesis i.s th.e "heat rate" or energy loss of the plant, not total 
ca,pi.tal expendi.tures, and the relevant measure of output is 
instantaneous power supply, not annual production. 
Second, picking up on a suggestion by Spann, McKay has 
noted that taxation can offset the A-J effect. If utility investments 
ar:e taxed more heavily than other forms of capital, taxation will to 
some degree offset the incentive the regulated firm has to use 
capital excessively. McKay shows that Spann's results disappear 
if account is taken of the effects of taxation. 
McKay also reestimates Courville's model, using the same 
data, but including more appropriate measures of inputs and outputs. 
He finds that, if anything, generating facilities are not as 
thermally efficient as would be economically optimal. Of course, 
McKay1s results do not prove that the A-J effect is not present; 
it could occur in other forms related to the design of the ·entire 
electrical generation and distribution system, for example. But 
his results do indicate that the A-J effect is not present in the 
form of substitutions of capital for fuel at the plant level. 
Studies of the effects of regulation in monopolistic 
industries must be regarded as inconclusive. This is not the 
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state of affairs in the literature regarding regulation of competition. 
Eads (1975), Keeler, and Douglas and Miller, have documented the 
cost-increasing effects of service competition in the airline 
indsutry, and illustrated how .CAB regulation has p roduced this 
result. Friedlaender, Harbeson, T. G. Moore (1975) , Meyer� al. 
and Peck have produced a series of cost-based estimates of the 
resource misallocation due to the regulation of surface freight 
transportation. Sparling has shown that, with a few corrections, 
these studies can be brought to rough conformity. Although the 
magnitude of the misallocation Sparling estimates is about half that 
of previous studies, it is nevertheless substantial, and there 
remains no widespread disagreement over this fundamental qualitative 
conclusion. Obviously, the state o f  affairs is not so settled in 
e:<aminations of the effect o f  regulation on monopolies. 
Conspicuous by its absence in the preceding discussion is 
reference to studies of the effect of regulation on the telecommunica­
tions industry. Unfortunately, there is simply no empirical literature 
on the effects of regulation on costs, input choices and prices in tele­
communications. Part of the problem is the difficulty that researchers 
outside of the industry face in assembling data to estimate valid 
demand, cost and production relations, with only demand studies 
prominent in the literature (see, especially, Littlechild) .  The 
internally produced studies, while occasionally interesting (see, 
especially Davis, Caccapolo and Chaudry) tend to avoid all possible 
explicit connections of performance to regulation. Another part of 
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the problem is the difficulty in sorting out the effects of regulation 
from the effects of AT&T's large market share. Since both AT&T 
and regulation of telecommunications are ubiquitous, a researcher 
faces an enormous task, indeed, in separating one effect from the other. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The folklore of regulatory economics that has developed in 
the past decade is that regulation does not affect prices or profits, 
but it does create inef ficiency. Stated so bluntly, the inconsistency 
of the prevailing wisdom is embarra5sing: obviously you· can not have 
your A-J and Stigler, too. 
Well-behaved members of the research cartel must conclude 
all surveys with a call for more research. Certainly no field of 
economics needs solid empirical work more desperately. 
While the existing literature is fraught with difficulties 
that make its findings ambiguous, a few problems stand out as 
especially important, and perhaps within human control. 
First, economists have not been especially careful in 
selecting functional forms to estimate when trying to characterize 
costs or production functions. Good empirical research on regulated 
industries, especially those employing relatively complex technology, 
probably requires at least a passing familiarity with the engineering, 
as well as the economic, realities of the production relations faced 
by regulated firms. Research on transportation industries has 
probably been more successful in this regard (perhaps the task is 
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easier), although the results do not appear to have filtered down to 
the Interstate Commerce Commission (see Grilliches). 
Second, regulators should pay some attention to the advice 
of staff economists in deciding upon the kinds of data that they 
require from regulated firms. Data that are inappropriately 
aggregated -- such as FPC data on average fuel bills -- are next to 
useless in econometric modeling, and p revent regulatory authorities 
from acquiring maximum possible understanding of the consequences of 
cheir actions. 
Third, economists should follow the lead of studies such 
as MacAyoy ( 1971) and the three papers by Joskow ( 1972, 1973 and 
1974) by devoting more attention to the process by which regulatory 
decis·ions are made. Such studies provide some insight into what 
regulators believe they are regulating and what basis they perceive 
to have for the decisions they make . Models based upon the seated 
objectives and actual procedures of regulatory agencies may generate 
empirically testable hypotheses about the effects of regulation -­
intended and unintended -- that present research has not considered. 
In any event, the voluminous A-J literature, ignoring as it does 
the facts that most regulators are principally interested in 
regulating prices and costs, not profits, and that firms are 
concerned with optimization over time when making long-term capital 
investments, probably has been more obfuscating than illuminating 
to empirical researchers. 
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